Perceptions of corporate boards about standards of corporate governance in Thailand by Jongsureyapart, Chatrudee & Wise, Victoria
          Deakin Research Online 
 
This is the published version:  
 
Jongsureyapart, Chatrudee and Wise, Victoria 2011, Perceptions of corporate boards about 
standards of corporate governance in Thailand, International journal of economics and 
management science, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 43-54.        
  
Available from Deakin Research Online: 
 
http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30042129 
 
Every reasonable effort has been made to ensure that permission has been obtained for items 
included in Deakin Research Online. If you believe that your rights have been infringed by 
this repository, please contact drosupport@deakin.edu.au 
 
Copyright : 2011, Society For Economics and Management Research (SEMAR) 
International Journal of Economics and Management Science 
Vol. 1, No. 1, January - June 2011. pp.43-54. 
Perceptions of Corporate Boards about Standards of 
Corporate Governance in Thailand 
Chatrudee Jongsureyapart
1
 and Victoria Wise2
The aim in this study is to discover the nature and extent of corporate governance in listed 
companies in Thailand. This includes a consideration of theoretical underpinning for amendments 
made to the western models of corporate governance that have been implemented by Thai listed 
companies, and of the effect of corporate governance principles on financial information, 
including financial reports, used by stakeholders in Thai listed companies. The results in this study 
show that after the Asian financial crisis corporate governance in Thailand improved especially in 
enforcement and disclosure, and outside/independent directors and professional organisations are 
playing leading roles in that process. Better corporate governance has resulted from improved 
internal corporate governance mechanisms and enhanced accounting standards, information 
disclosure, and auditing standards. New and up-dated rules, new and revised laws, and increased 
regulation are in the forefront of improved corporate governance. Process-related activities like 
monitoring, supervising, enforcing, and higher awareness have increased. Moreover, corporate 
governance practices are now in the spotlight throughout the financial and investment markets. 
INTRODUCTION 
1Globally, corporate governance has become a key 
focus in the international business agendas of not 
just corporations but also of governments and 
supranational authorities. Indeed, the World Bank 
sees the corporate governance agenda being 
anchored to our development agenda at a number 
of critical points: international financial stability; 
broadening access to capital; promoting efficiency; 
fighting corruption; and fastening the savings that 
will ultimately broaden welfare provision. The 
spectacular collapses of Enron, WorldCom, Tyco 
and Global Crossing in the United States of 
America (USA), HIH in Australia, Parmalat in 
Italy and APP in Asia were obviously key 
motivators for the heightened interest in corporate 
governance (Anandarajah, 2004). 
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In Asia, corporate governance has additionally 
gained greater distinction since the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997. Corporate governance is claimed, 
by a large number of authors who point to serious 
structural weaknesses in the financial markets and 
the lack of prudential controls, as having lead to 
the financial crisis (Alba, Clasessens a&nd 
Djankov, 1998; Keong, 2002; Claessens, Djankov 
& Lang, 2000). Many authors (Kaplan & Minton, 
1994; Limpaphayom & Connelly, 2004; Iskander 
& Chamlou, 2000; Nam & Lum, 2005; Claessens, 
Djankov & Lang, 2000) also claim that better 
governance may result from improved internal 
corporate governance mechanisms and enhanced 
accounting, disclosure, and auditing standards. In 
addition, the results of several studies 
(Limpaphayom & Connelly, 2004; Nam & Lum, 
2005) show that corporate governance benefits 
companies with respect to increased long-term 
investment and increased credibility. 
The USA introduced the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 
2002 and made major changes to the New York,
2
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Stock Exchange Listing Rules. In the United 
Kingdom (UK), the Combined Code underwent a 
review with the resultant Cadbury Report, 
Greenbury Report, Hampel Report, Higgs 
Reviews, and the Smith and Turnbull Report being 
introduced. Although, many of the initiatives in the 
USA and the UK were pushed for by the 
respective regulators, the initiatives in the Asian 
region were motivated by the combined efforts of 
the World Bank and the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). In 1999, The OECD Principles, which 
have been accepted the world over, initially 
identified the following principles as the five key 
elements of a strong corporate governance 
framework: the rights of shareholders, the 
equitable treatment of shareholders, the role of 
stakeholders in corporate governance, disclosure 
and transparency, and the responsibilities of the 
board of directors. 
The OECD Principles have been a reference for 
corporate governance initiatives around the world. 
The new OECD Principles presented in April 2004 
included a sixth key area of corporate governance. 
The Principles (OECD, 2004) now include: 
ensuring the basis for an effective corporate 
governance framework; the rights of shareholders; 
the equitable treatment of shareholders; the role of 
stakeholders in corporate governance; disclosure 
and transparency; and responsibilities of the board 
of directors. 
Thailand has introduced codes of corporate 
governance which adopt the OECD Principles to 
varying degrees. Thailand, similar to many other 
Asian countries, had poor corporate governance 
systems which contributed to the financial crisis in 
1997, as its banks, specialised financial institutions 
and corporations had previously been effectively 
protected from the operation of market discipline. 
Prior to the Asian financial crisis, Thai corporate 
governance practices were characterised by 
ineffective boards of directors, weak internal 
controls, unreliable financial reporting, inadequate 
protection of minority shareholder rights, lack of 
adequate disclosure, poor audits, and generally 
lacked enforcement to ensure regulatory 
compliance. Additionally, the dominance of family 
control over business operations was prevalent; 
Thai firms were generally held and managed by 
majority family interests. 
The Thai Government has since introduced a 
reform strategy which focuses on streamlining 
institutional arrangements, enhancing the 
reliability of financial information and disclosure, 
improving corporate board oversight and 
effectiveness, and improving shareholder rights. It 
has also focused on improving the effectiveness of 
the legal and regulatory framework for the 
enforcement of laws and regulations related to 
public companies. In particular, the current Thai 
Government has given significant focus to good 
corporate governance – the ‘Year 2002 Good 
Corporate Governance Campaign’ being one 
example of this initiative. This focus came about 
not only as a result of international scandals but 
also following international investors’ complaints 
that Thai publicly listed companies lacked 
transparency with respect to their business 
operations. 
According to Hongcharu (2002) prior to 1997, the 
Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) had realised 
the significance of corporate governance in 
developing its capital markets and commissioned 
Price Waterhouse Management Consultants Ltd to 
undertake the first survey of listed companies and 
others concerned with the capital market. The 
survey was undertaken in mid-1996. After the 
sudden flotation of the Thai currency, the baht, in 
July 1997, the lack of corporate governance was 
regarded as one of the most significant factors 
contributing to the collapse of banks and many 
finance companies in Thailand. Several laws were 
drafted and corporate governance practices were 
incorporated. The Thai Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and the SET cited four factors 
as their rationale to promote good corporate 
governance: fairness; transparency; accountability; 
responsibility. These four factors have been 
incorporated in most of the legal instruments 
supported by the government, the SEC and the 
SET. 
A policy study on “Thailand’s Corporate 
Financing and Governance Structures” was 
conducted by Alba, Clasessens and Djankov 
(1998) for the World Bank. Analysing financial 
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statements of companies listed on the SET, they 
found five problems related to corporate 
governance: concentration of ownership, high level 
of diversification, weak market incentives, lack of 
protection for minority shareholders, and 
inadequate accounting standards and practices. 
These problems should decrease as a result of 
implementation of corporate governance by 
organisations in Thailand. 
The current study investigates the relevance of 
corporate governance: to the Thai financial crisis 
in 1997; ownership structure; regulation; and 
disclosure requirements in listed companies in 
Thailand. This study also investigates the nature 
and extent of corporate governance principles, as 
applied in Thailand, adapted from western models 
of corporate governance. The overall aim in this 
study is to assess the impact of corporate 
governance on ownership structure, board structure 
and composition, directors’ and officers’ legal 
duties in listed companies in Thailand and to 
provide information that would be of use to listed 
companies in their attempts to improve corporate 
governance structures. This study also provides an 
analysis and understanding of the nature and extent 
of corporate governance principles as applied by 
listed companies in Thailand. 
This study proceeds by an investigation of the 
following matters. Firstly, the nature and extent of 
corporate governance in Thai listed companies; the 
importance of alterations to western models of 
corporate governance mechanisms in Thailand; 
improvements in the financial reports of Thai 
companies resulting from the implementation of 
corporate governance; and the measures for 
strengthening corporate governance in Thailand. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Each of the matters to be investigated is briefly 
considered in this literature review. Expected 
research outcomes are developed in this section. 
i) To discover the nature and extent of 
corporate governance in listed companies in 
Thailand 
Thailand faced a financial crisis in 1997 and the 
crisis has been attributed to poor corporate 
governance. The criticisms of corporate 
governance in Thailand are mainly in respect of 
the high concentration of ownership, excessive 
government intervention, an under-developed 
capital market and a weak legal and regulatory 
framework for investor protection. Alba, 
Clasessens and Djankov (1998) indicate that bank, 
finance and securities companies were not 
sufficiently cautious about their lending. The Bank 
of Thailand (BOT) and the SET did not have 
corrective measures on financial performance; and 
furthermore, auditors did not announce real 
information about the financial performance of 
business. An objective in this study was to 
discover the nature and extent of corporate 
governance in Thailand. It was expected that 
corporate governance and regulation in Thailand 
would have improved since the financial crisis in 
1997. It was also expected that despite some 
change, the ownership structure would still be in 
the hands of very few families. 
ii) To examine the importance of alterations to 
western models of corporate governance 
mechanisms in Thailand 
The SET and the Thai SEC have adopted several 
measures to improve the accountability of 
management to shareholders, to enhance 
transparency and disclosure, and to ensure fairness 
to all shareholders. They studied corporate 
governance practices in several developed markets 
and adopted the practices deemed suitable to the 
Thai culture. As a result, western models of 
corporate governance mechanisms may be applied 
in Thailand. Many researchers have suggested a 
mixture of corporate governance models is 
appropriate for developing countries such as 
Thailand (Alba, Clasessens & Djankov, 1998; 
Keong, 2002; Khan 2004). It was expected that 
alterations of western models of corporate 
governance mechanisms may be appropriate for 
Thailand. 
iii) To investigate the improvements in financial 
reports of Thai companies resulting from 
the implementation of corporate governance 
The results of several studies (Alba, Hernandez & 
Klingebiel, 1999; Limpaphayom & Connelly, 
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2004; Nam & Lum, 2005; Claessens, Djankov & 
Lang, 2000) indicate that corporate governance 
and disclosure systems were weak in Thailand 
prior to the financial crisis. In addition, the capital 
markets played a limited role in the governance of 
firms. It was expected that organisations such as 
the SET and SEC might drive Thai companies to 
accept the rules and implementation of corporate 
governance. It was also expected in this study that 
information disclosure and transparency in 
financial reports would have improved since the 
Thai financial crisis. 
iv) To recommend a number of measures for 
strengthening corporate governance in 
Thailand 
Alba, Clasessens and Djankov (1998) investigated 
issues on Thai corporate governance problems and 
concluded that the most important task in 
improving the structure of corporate financing and 
the framework for corporate governance was to 
change incentives by enhancing enterprise 
monitoring, improving disclosure and accounting 
practices, better enforcement of corporate 
governance rules, facilitating equity institutions, 
and strengthening institutions. Hence, in this study 
the appropriateness of these recommendations for 
strengthening corporate governance in Thailand 
are examined. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The purpose of this study is to investigate what 
occurs in the context of relatively little corporate 
governance regulation and a new demand for 
corporate governance stemming from the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997. 
Proposition 1 
According to Warr (1999), Thailand, like most 
economies based on private enterprise, has had 
serious company failures. Since 1997 many of 
these have been attributed to the financial crisis, 
but further investigation has shown that the 
underlying weaknesses of Thai corporate 
structures made them highly exposed to such 
crises. In this study, it was considered important to 
discover whether corporate governance has 
improved since the Asian financial crisis. 
Therefore, one of the objectives of this research is 
to discover the nature and extent of corporate 
governance in listed companies in Thailand. It was 
expected that corporate governance and regulation 
of rules in Thailand have improved since the Asian 
financial crisis. This objective generates 
Proposition 1. 
There is a relationship between corporate 
governance and each of the Thai financial crisis, 
ownership structure, and regulation of listed 
companies in Thailand. 
Proposition 2 
On the grounds that Thailand is an Asian country 
with environmental characteristics such as culture 
and styles of business operation that differ from 
western countries, variables affecting the 
successful implementation of corporate 
governance in Thailand may not be the same as 
those in western countries. In addition, Letza et al., 
(2004) indicate that corporate governance is 
completely changeable and transformable and 
there is no permanent or universal principle which 
covers all societies, cultures and business 
situations. Although there are many corporate 
governance models, researchers have concluded 
that each governance system has its own 
weaknesses; no perfect system exists that can be 
applied to all countries. 
Western style principles and models of corporate 
governance, developed by the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the OECD 
have been proposed as preferred theoretical 
reporting models for Thailand. Therefore it is an 
objective in this study to extend the theory in this 
area to include information characteristics 
fundamental to the share ownership and familial 
control patterns that exist in the Thai context. This 
objective leads to Proposition 2. 
There will be significant differences from western 
models of corporate governance mechanisms in 
listed companies in Thailand 
Proposition 3 
The Asian financial crisis has shown that the 
economy in Thailand was weak in the area of 
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corporate governance. Alba, Clasessens and 
Djankov (1998) indicate that lack of transparency 
and the lack of solid information regarding 
financial transactions as a result of this structural 
feature may have been critical factors contributing 
to the Thai crisis. It was expected that the Thai 
Government, the SET, and the SEC might improve 
regulations related to information disclosure as 
part of its program to implement corporate 
governance. This expectation generates 
Proposition 3. 
There will be significant improvement in 
information disclosure in financial reports of Thai 
companies resulting from the implementation of 
corporate governance. 
Proposition 4 
There were three different groups of individuals 
whose opinions and perceptions were considered 
important in this study, Chief Executive Officers 
(CEOs); executive directors; and 
outside/independent directors (audit committee). It 
was expected that each group would have different 
views about how to strengthen corporate 
governance in Thailand. This expectation leads to 
Proposition 4. 
There will be significant differences in measures of 
responses from different groups for strengthening 
corporate governance in Thailand. 
RESEARCH METHODS 
This study will proceed in two distinct yet inter-
linked stages. These are: (1) An extensive 
literature review; (2) Collection of data from a 
survey. 
Stage 1: An extensive literature review 
Numerous books and articles have explained 
corporate governance with respect to benefits, 
problems, implementation, success and 
satisfaction. This research commenced with a 
thorough international search of all pertinent 
literature for the reason that numerous 
international studies have investigated various 
aspects of the implementation of corporate 
governance whereas there are only a small number 
of studies of corporate governance in Thailand 
where corporate governance is a relatively new 
phenomenon. This stage of the research drew upon 
the knowledge base of materials from several 
disciplines to build the propositions of the 
research. 
Stage 2: Collecting data from survey 
In this study a survey of 453 listed companies in 
eight industries on various aspects of corporate 
governance in Thailand was conducted. The 
industries and the number of companies in each 
industry are as follows. Agro and Food industry 
(42); Consumer Products (37); Financial (66); 
Industrials (50); Property and Construction (80); 
Resources (18); Services (78); and Technology 
(43); Other (39). 
As the population, comprising all companies listed 
on the SET that operate in the Bangkok region 
(453 companies), is very large, a mailed 
questionnaire survey (the ‘questionnaire’) was 
regarded as the appropriate method for gathering 
data and testing the research propositions 
(Ticehurst & Veal 1999; Sekaran 2000). 
Questionnaires, which were subjected to ‘translate-
retranslate’, were sent to the CEO, the executive 
directors, and outside/independent directors (audit 
committee) responsible for the implementation of 
corporate governance within companies. Approval 
of the questionnaire was obtained from the Human 
Research Ethics Committee of Victoria University. 
DATA ANALYSIS 
The quantitative data analysis, together with the 
testing of propositions relating to cultural effects 
and performance such as family ownership, 
involved the use of the Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences (SPSS) program for statistical 
analysis. Tests included descriptive and inferential 
statistical analysis: frequencies, means, standard 
deviations of attributes of good corporate 
governance, board of directors, audit committee, 
disclosure, and shareholder rights, with measures 
of performance.  
48 International Journal of Economics and Management Science, Vol. 1, No. 1, January - June 2011. 
Frequency distributions were suitable for analysis 
of data such as the personal information, the 
classification of industry groups, the company 
size, the ownership structure, decision making in 
the company, board size, board structure, 
independence of board members, board meetings, 
board qualification and independence of board 
members, audit committee size, audit committee 
structure, audit committee meetings, qualification, 
position and truly independent. In addition, 
information disclosure, language available, 
shareholder rules, shareholder meetings, function 
of the board of directors, background information, 
ethics and governance improvement, incentives for 
investment, initiation of corporate governance, 
tasks for better corporate governance, level of 
corporate governance, and benefits of corporate 
governance, are also tested using frequency 
distributions. 
Other statistical measures, such as means and 
standard deviations, are used in analysing data 
such as the ownership structure, decision-making 
in the company, function of the board of directors, 
information and disclosure for shareholders and 
procedure for shareholder meetings, function of 
the board of directors, effectiveness of the board, 
rules to improve corporate governance, enhancing 
corporate governance in Thailand, better 
performance of independent directors, and the 
impact of the implementation of corporate 
governance in Thailand. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The questionnaires in this study were addressed to 
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), executive 
directors, and outside/independent directors of 
each company. This resulted in 1,359 
questionnaires being sent and 160 usable 
questionnaires being returned. Not all questions on 
the 160 usable responses were completed by the 
respondents: the total number of respondents is 
indicated in each of tables 2, 4, 8 and 9 is 136, 
135, 135 and 134 respectively. Of the 453 
companies, 101 returned questionnaires; 62 
companies each returned one questionnaire, 19 
companies each returned two questionnaires and 
20 companies each returned three complete 
questionnaires. 
Table 1: Response rate 
 Number of 
questionnaires 
Number of 
companies 
Questionnaires  1359 453 
Unanswered 24 8 
Net 
questionnaires  
1335 445 
Usable 
responses 
160 101 
Response rate 11.98% 22.69% 
Table 2: Broad demographic characteristics of 
respondents 
Charact-
eristics 
Categories 
Fre-
quency 
Percent
-age 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
Total 
119 
17 
136 
87.5 
12.5 
100 
Age 
20-30 years 
31-40 
41-50 
51-60 
Over 60 
years 
Total 
2 
13 
56 
39 
26 
 
136 
1.4 
9.6 
41.2 
28.7 
19.1 
 
100 
Education 
Less than a 
degree 
Degree 
Master’s 
degree 
Doctorate 
Total 
1 
 
35 
93 
 
7 
136 
0.8 
 
25.7 
68.4 
 
5.1 
100 
Country 
of 
graduation 
Thailand 
Overseas 
Total 
72 
64 
136 
52.9 
47.1 
100 
Many (64%) of the respondents serve on more than 
one board of directors, and 36% of the respondents 
serve on only one board. The respondents that 
serve on only one board are all CEOs. 15 (13%) 
respondents serve on more than five boards. The 
maximum number of boards on which a 
respondent serves is thirteen. The majority of 
respondents serve on between 1-5 boards (87%). 
Nam (2004) predicted that if a corporate officer 
serves on more than one board conflict of interest 
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may occur that could lead to poor corporate 
governance. Furthermore Nam and Lum (2005) 
show that in Thailand, bank directors are not 
permitted to serve in more than three business 
groups. The fact that some directors (13%) are still 
serving on a large number of boards has negative 
corporate governance implications. These results 
are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3: Service on other boards of directors 
Number 
of other 
Boards 
Frequency Percentage Ranging 
1 41 36 1 
2 17 15 2 
3 16 14 4= 
4 9 8 5 
5 16 14 4= 
6 4 3 7 
7 1 1 11= 
8 5 4 6 
10 3 3 8 
11 1 1 11= 
13 1 1 11= 
In this study, the number of employees, net assets, 
market capitalisation and net profit were variables 
chosen to measure the size of companies. The 
broad ranges chosen for the number of employees 
were from less than 500 to more than 2,000 (SET, 
2003; Chongruksut, 2002). Most respondent 
companies have less than 1,000 employees. These 
respondent companies are likely to be family 
controlled companies as these tend to be small 
rather than large. Claessens, Djankov and Lang 
(2000) also found that ownership of many Thai 
public companies is family dominated. Table 4 
shows that 45% of the responding companies have 
less than 500 employees (small size), and 24% 
have between 501-1,000 employees (medium 
size).  
Table 4: Number of employees 
Number of 
employees 
Frequency Percentage 
Less than 500 
(small size) 
60 45 
501-1,000  
(medium size) 
33 24 
1,001-1500 
(medium size) 
11 8 
1,501-2,000  
(large size) 
11 8 
More than 2,000 
(large size) 
20 15 
Total 135 100 
Table 5 shows the ownership structure of the 
companies. Multiple responses were received from 
some companies. 74 of 131 responding companies 
are partially owned, but not controlled by foreign 
investors. 63 of 129 responding companies are the 
family-based business groups and 38 of 130 of the 
respondent companies are single companies. As 
expected, companies in Thailand are characterised 
as having highly concentrated ownership 
structures. La Porta, Lopez de-Silanes and Shleifer 
Table 5: Ownership structure 
Ownership structure 
Yes No Total 
No. % No. % No. % 
Single company 38 29 92 71 130 100 
Holding company family-based business group 44 34 85 66 129 100 
Subsidiary of a family-based business group 19 15 110 85 129 100 
Partially owned, and controlled by the government 2 2 127 98 129 100 
Partially owned, but not controlled by the government 14 11 115 89 129 100 
Partially owned, and controlled by foreigners 12 9 118 91 130 100 
Partially owned, but not controlled by foreign investor 74 56 57 44 131 100 
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(1999) noted that in most East Asian countries 
corporate control is enhanced through pyramidal 
structures and cross-holdings among family-
controlled firms. Family-based business groups are 
likely to be more reluctant to implement corporate 
governance structures and processes than 
companies that have sizeable foreign 
shareholdings. 
 
Table 6: Composition of the board 
Directors on Board 
Yes No Total 
No. % No. % No. % 
Accountant/Lawyer  127 94 9 6 136 100 
Representative of a financial institution  48 35 88 65 136 100 
Representative of a customer company    9 7 126 93 135 100 
Representative of a labor union  0 0 136 100 136 100 
Representative or member of controlling 
shareholder’s family  
88 65 48 35 136 100 
Representative of a supplier 8 6 128 94 136 100 
Government appointee-member of parliament   0 0 135 100 135 100 
Government appointee-public service 22 16 112 84 134 100 
Government appointee-other 12 9 124 91 136 100 
Table 7: Disclosure and transparency (%) 
Information disclosed 
Web Site Annual Report No Disclosure 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Semi-annual financial statements 79.8 20.2 24.0 76.0 7.8 92.2 
Quarterly financial statements 84.6 15.4 21.5 78.5 4.6 95.4 
Consolidated financial statements 69.5 30.5 80.9 19.1 2.3 97.7 
Major share ownership and voting rights 47.4 52.6 88.0 12.0 2.3 97.7 
Self-dealing (related-party) transactions 43.5 56.5 90.1 9.9 4.6 95.4 
Names of board members 63.7 36.3 94.1 5.9 0 100.0 
Directors selling or buying of shares in the 
company 
45.1 54.9 56.6 43.4 18.0 82.0 
Resume/background of directors 40.7 59.3 91.9 8.1 2.2 97.8 
Remuneration of directors 29.6 70.4 93.3 6.7 4.4 95.6 
Fees paid to external auditors, advisors, and 
related parties 
26.9 73.1 88.1 11.9 9.0 91.0 
Major contingent liabilities such as cross-
guarantees of debt    
27.9 72.1 86.0 14.0 10.1 89.9 
Policies on risk management and the company 
objectives    
23.7 76.3 95.6 4.4 3.7 96.3 
Significant changes in ownership 27.6 72.4 69.8 30.2 21.6 78.4 
Material issues regarding employees and 
stakeholders 
22.5 77.5 79.1 20.9 16.3 83.7 
Governance structures and policies 33.1 66.9 91.7 8.3 6.0 94.0 
Extent to which corporate governance practices 
conform to established standards  
27.5 72.5 91.6 8.4 7.6 92.4 
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The board often included members of controlling 
shareholder’s families (88 of 136) (65%). Bertrand 
et al. (2004) believe that the pressure of family 
members is likely to have a negative impact on the 
implementation of corporate governance, and is 
likely to cause conflicts of interest. None of the 
boards of directors has members representing 
labour unions or government appointed members 
of parliament. These results are shown in Table 6. 
The data in Table 7 show that most companies 
disclose all major corporate information in their 
annual report. They also provide semi-annual and 
quarterly financial statements. Financial statement 
information is disclosed on the main company web 
site. One of the six OECD Principles (OECD, 
2004) is the requirement to provide adequate 
disclosure, and Thai companies appear to have 
embraced this Western-style guideline. 
Table 8 shows the respondents’ beliefs in relation 
to improvement in the standard of business ethics 
and corporate governance in Thailand over the last 
five years. Most respondents agreed that overall, 
corporate governance in Thailand had improved 
(97%). 72% of respondents believed it had 
improved considerably, and only 25% of 
respondents believed that, generally, little 
improvement had occurred. These results support 
the view of Limpaphayom and Connelly (2004) 
who said that corporate governance in Thailand 
has improved since the financial crisis.  
Table 8: The standard of business ethics and 
corporate governance 
 Frequency Percentage 
Improved 
considerably 
98 72 
Improved a little 34 25 
Remained largely 
unchanged 
1 1 
Deteriorated 
slightly 
1 1 
Deteriorated a lot 0 0 
Unsure 1 1 
Total 135 100 
The majority of respondents (87%) show that the 
state of the corporate governance regime in 
Thailand provides an incentive for foreign 
investment in Thailand. National Corporate 
Governance Committee (NCGC) (2005) stated that 
corporate governance ensures transparency and 
stakeholders are less likely to take risks with an 
organisation without a good corporate governance 
structure. Iskander and Chamlou (2000) argued 
that improved transparency and good corporate 
governance structures are likely to provide an 
inducement to foreign investors. These results, 
shown in Table 9, provide further general 
indicators that corporate governance in Thailand is 
both improving, and seen to be improving. 
The findings drawn from the analysis of 
questionnaire data highlight the factors that 
determine corporate governance in Thailand. The 
key findings included that most respondents’ 
backgrounds are banker/ financiers and 
accountants (97%) indicating their business and 
educational background is likely to have been a 
positive factor in the implementation of corporate 
governance by Thai companies. The ownership 
structures of respondent companies, indicates 
substantial levels of partial ownership, but not 
control, by foreigners (56%). If the respondent 
companies are a family-based business group most 
of the respondents believe that the owners’ family 
negotiate fairly with top management and share a 
common vision about the company. 
Table 9: Improved corporate governance is an 
incentive for investment 
 Frequency Percentage 
Yes  117 87 
No 1 1 
Unsure 16 12 
Total 134 100 
Regarding the roles of CEOs and board, the results 
show that most important decisions are made by 
the board of directors (60%). The size of the board 
of directors is large (76% have between 8-12 
members, and 18% more than 12 members, 
maximum is 18). Most boards have relatively few 
independent directors (56% have 3 independent), 
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which may have adverse implications for the 
successful implementation of a good corporate 
governance structure. The main function of the 
board appears to be to review financial reports and 
ensure the integrity of the company financial 
report.  
Most respondents agreed (97%) that corporate 
governance in Thailand had improved and also 
indicated that the SET (81%) and the SEC (86%) 
are the most important organisations for the 
promotion and improvement of corporate 
governance in Thailand. Finally, the greatest 
impact of the implementation of corporate 
governance in Thailand was seen in improved 
transparency and disclosure, followed by support 
from top management and truly independent 
directors, as well as the introduction of appropriate 
checks and balances. 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY 
In 1997, the Asian financial crisis occurred. This 
crisis led to the collapse of many companies and to 
the introduction of corporate governance structures 
in countries like Thailand. As a result, interest in 
corporate governance increased in Thailand. 
Government, business, institutional investors, 
professional advisers, consultants and academics 
have all taken a closer interest in issues like 
corporate ownership structure, board structure and 
composition, directors’ and officers’ legal duties 
and chief executive officer’s remuneration. Good 
corporate governance in listed companies is likely 
to increase confidence and trust in the Thai capital 
market. 
One of the most important characteristics of the 
corporate sector in Thailand is the feature of 
family control over business operations. At the 
time of the 1997 financial crisis, Thai public 
companies were characterised by their large family 
ownership with family members and related-party 
shareholders as the controlling shareholders. Lack 
of transparency and the lack of solid information 
regarding financial transactions as a result of this 
structural feature may have been critical factors 
contributing to the Thai financial crisis (Alba, 
Claessens & Djankov, 1998). 
It was expected that when a company was in a 
reactionary economy, it would learn to improve 
corporate governance. Proposition 1 examined the 
relationship between corporate governance and 
each of the following variables: the Thai financial 
crisis; ownership structure; and, regulation in listed 
companies in Thailand. The results confirmed that 
after the Thai financial crisis corporate governance 
in Thailand improved. The regulation and rules 
governing listed companies in Thailand were 
improved by the Stock Exchange of Thailand 
(SET) and the Thai Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). The major changes and 
reform efforts have been in the area of process 
especially in enforcement and disclosure. New and 
updated rules, new and revised laws, and increased 
regulatory oversight have been the outcome of the 
push for increased corporate governance. 
Corporate governance in Thailand is currently at a 
crossroads. Much of the relevant literature claims 
huge benefits from the implementation of 
corporate governance. Thus, corporate governance 
has received substantial interest from Thai 
companies and regulators and is of concern to both 
the public sector and the private sector. 
The international corporate governance system 
assumes a separation of ownership and control, a 
questionable assumption in the Thai context. Since 
the Asian financial crisis, all listed companies, 
especially family-owned businesses, have made 
generally poor information disclosure about 
related-parties transactions. This could be 
improved as part of the move to promote and 
enhance corporate governance. Family owners 
should be more interested in working with outside 
shareholders to maximise firm value. 
Consideration should be given to the use of outside 
directors, a tool normally used in western cultures.  
The purpose is that outside directors can help 
monitor management and family owners. 
However, Thai people are non-confrontational and 
group-orientated. Many boards become so-called 
“rubber stamp” boards, not because directors are 
unaware or uninterested in their roles and duties 
but because they are being considerate and 
respectful of the owner’s decisions (Limpaphayom 
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et al. 2004). Further, there is a limited number of 
individuals qualified to serve as outside directors 
and fewer still that can be considered truly 
independent. The use of outside board members 
can be a very powerful tool under a corporate 
governance system that recognises institutional 
and cultural differences. 
Cultural attitude is important to identify the root 
cause for legal tardiness in Asian countries where 
legal practices are considered a foreign element 
that is not part of Asian culture. Actual 
implementation of legal processes is mostly 
avoided and settlement outside the court is more 
popular. Corruption is another factor that does not 
ensure justice for those who need or warrant it. 
However, corruption has a long history in Thai 
culture, stretching over many centuries. The Thai 
aversion to confrontation inherent in any 
adversarial legal system means that parties prefer 
amicable settlement rather than litigation. 
After the Asian financial crisis, the influence of 
institutional investors and of investor activists has 
grown steadily. Institutional investors are taking a 
more active role and exercising their voting rights 
more frequently. The results show that all 
respondent companies provided adequate and 
timely information. 
The roles and effectiveness of the board of 
directors of Thai listed companies have responded 
to the drive by regulators to develop more 
independent boards. The results in this study show 
that all companies have independent directors on 
their boards, with a large majority of respondent 
companies having three or more independent 
directors on the board. This is partly a result of the 
SET requirement that all listed firms must have an 
audit committee consisting of at least three 
independent directors.  The results also show that 
Thai boards are active, engaged, and take their 
responsibilities very seriously. 
After the financial crisis the Thai Constitution was 
amended to include provisions to prevent conflicts 
of interest between elected officials and big 
business, including an unprecedented bar on 
politicians holding shares in companies.  Such 
provisions were seen as necessary to avoid 
repetition of the corruption in previous 
governments that greatly contributed to Thailand’s 
1997 financial collapse. However, in a significant 
oversight the Thai Constitution does not bar family 
members of politicians from owning shares in 
companies that do business with the government 
(Shawn, 2003). 
Stakeholder theory is that companies are so large 
and their impact on society so pervasive that they 
should discharge accountability to many more 
sectors than solely their shareholders (Solomon & 
Solomon, 2004). If corporate governance in 
Thailand is to improve, outside directors and 
professional societies will be expected to play the 
leading roles, supplemented by efforts of financial 
supervisory agencies and the judiciary. Better 
governance would also result from improved 
internal corporate governance mechanisms and 
enhanced accounting, disclosure, and auditing 
standards (Limpaphayom & Connelly 2004). 
As a summary, in this study corporate governance 
in Thailand is regarded as improving, and outside 
directors and professional organisations are 
identified as playing leading roles. Better 
governance has resulted from improved internal 
corporate governance mechanisms and enhanced 
accounting, disclosure, and auditing standards. 
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